Posted by marykeating on January 14, 2012 under Religious discrimination | 
This week, the Supreme Court decided a closely watched Case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Cheryl Perich was a teacher at a Christian school. She sued the school after her termination, claiming the discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The school countered that the Courts had no right to interfere with how they decided their personnel matters, given the separation of church and state.
Courts have refused to get involved in disputes over the firing of a church’s pastor, invoking the “ministerial exception,” adopted by the Supreme Court in this decision. The gray areas involving other employees of religious institutions led to subtle rules. The Supreme Court sweeps a lot of that away with this decision. The teacher in this case was “called” to her faith, and counted as a religious minister, though her religious duties at this school were minor. She had a special diploma and commissioned by her congregation’s vote. Other teachers who were not “called” performed the same functions, but because of ther status as a commissioned minister, the Court said it would not decide whether her termination violated federal law. It therefore refused to consider the school’s argument that she was fired for violating church policy of resolving disputes internally, and not through courts. The Supreme Court stopped short of requiring a reason for the firing; it says that federal courts are constitutionally forbidden from questioning such terminations.
Posted by marykeating on September 29, 2011 under Interesting cases, Religious discrimination |
It’s almost the first Monday in October, and the Supreme Court’s first week includes a religious employer case. These issues have been percolating for a few years, and both the Fourth Circuit and Maryland recently weighed in with decisions.
In the Supreme Court case, a teacher at a Christian school charged that her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. After several years as a teacher of both secular and religious courses, Cheryl Perich developed narcolepsy, and missed several months of the school year. The school refused to permit her return, and she threatened to sue under the ADA. The school then contended that her suit threat contravened the religious principles of the Evangelical Lutheran sect.
The case presents an interesting intersection of the religious exemption problems that come up in employment cases. One exemption is afforded institutions to permit employment decisions based on religion. The exemption furthers freedom of religion as well as the separation of church and state. A teacher of Jewish studies can be fired by his school for doctrinal reasons, or for not adhering to certain tenets of the faith. But in this case, the teacher claims two things: one, that she was fired in retaliation for taking time off for her disability, and complaining of her treatment; and two, if the reason was religion-based (an avoidance of conflict, for example), she should not fall within the ministerial exemption because, for one reasons, she taught secular subjects for the most part, with a minimal religious component.
Posted by marykeating on September 28, 2011 under Religious discrimination |
A new case by the state’s highest court addressed a raging issue – do religious institutions have free rein to discriminate against employees, or must there be a religious component to the discrimination?
The new case involved a claim by Mary Linklater that the Prince of Peace Lutheran Church in Montgomery County. On the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed that “the evidence was sufficient to establish that Respondent (1) was the victim of sexual harassment, (2) complained about the harassment, and (3) was the victim of additional harassment and retaliation as a result of her complaints.” The employee won a substantial verdict at trial.
The more difficult constitutional issues arise because the employee was employed as a music director by a church. Music directors are involved in a church’s ministry, and courts try to stay out of church governance issues because of the First Amendment. On the other hand, as an employer subject to the laws of the state and country, a church employer is bound by laws that do not encroach on religious issues, such as sex discrimination. To relieve churches of all employment laws would tilt the church/state barrier too far in favor of churches, favoring religion, which also violates the First Amendment.
It gets murkier with sexual harassment. While sexual harassment is sex discrimination, and therefore not off limits under a church and state separation analysis, part of Ms. Linklater’s claims stated that her harassing boss engaged in quid pro quo harassment. That is, Ms. Linklater claimed that she was promised a job benefit only if she gave in to her boss’s requests for sexual favors. To judge whether she makes out all parts of her claim, though, the court has to look at whether her job performance was good enough to get the promotion without the sexual harassment. This intrudes on a church’s religious freedom. Similarly, the Court of Appeas decided that the retaliation firing claim intruded too closely on a religious institution’s ability to make its own employment decisions. The hostile work environment claim, however, survives.
The Court did not unanimously agree on this issue. The dissent would limit the religious exemption to a situation where a termination decision had a “spiritual rationale.” The hurch had not offered a reason for the firing that had anything to do with its doctrine.
As a result of this decision, the case will be returned to the trial court. The verdict is erased on state law counts, but now Ms. Linklater may pursue her gender discrimination and sexual harassment hostile environment claims.
Posted by marykeating on September 19, 2011 under Religious discrimination |
The federal anti-discrimination law known as Title VII applies to nearly all employers of more than 15 people. Among other protected categories is the religion of an employee. While the number of charges of discrimination for religious harassment or discrimination is far less than the race and sex based claims, the volume is still significant.
A number of cases over the years have addressed the breadth of Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations as employers. The Fourth Circuit last week made plain that the law exempted religious organizations from all hiring and other employment decisions, including harassment and retaliation. The exemption means “that the government interest in eliminating religious discrimination by religious organizations is outweighed by the rights of those organizations to be free from government intervention.”
In the case that brought this to the Fourth Circuit, an employee of a Catholic nursing care facility refused her employer’s request not to dress in a certain way, reflective of her religious organization’s emphasis on modest dress. When she refused, she was fired. She admitted that the law permitted her to be fired, but contended that the request not to wear her head covering and Thus, although the Catholic facility hired the employee, knowing she was not Catholic, it was free to fire her because of her religious beliefs or impose terms of employment that might conflict with her beliefs.
Significantly, the dissent to the opinion disagreed with the procedural manner in which the case reached the court, but did not believe that the nursing facility’s insistence that the employee alter her manner of dress came anywhere close to actionable harassment.
Posted by marykeating on April 22, 2011 under Interesting cases, Religious discrimination |
The Supreme Court has decided to hear a case involving the extent to which religious employers are free from the laws forbidding discrimination. In a number of cases, charges of religious discrimination have failed where an employee’s duties have been held to be central to the church’s mission. For example, preachers have been unable to ask a court to put them back in their jobs. Other church employees, such as chaplains and directors of church choirs, cannot seek redress in the courts if their duties are too directly linked to the church’s teachings, because then the courts of the United States would get too entangled in religion, in violation of the First Amendment. Teachers in religious schools, however, often are permitted to sue, since their primary duties relate to non-religious subjects.
In the new case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, an elementary school teacher was fired after she took leave under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Upon her attempted return, the school decided that she may not be ready, and reqeusted her resignation. She refused to resign, as instructed, and threatened to sue. She and the EEOC claimed her termination was illegal retaliation; the employer stated it was her insubordination, which violated church doctrine. The teacher contends that her job did not involve any pastoral or missionary duties, and her religious teaching duties were minor compared with the rest of her job. Importantly, the job she did was not required to be held by a Lutheran. In the Fourth Circuit, the court long ago decided that churches’ “t]heir employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church’s spiritual functions.” Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985)
It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court draws a line between the kinds of discrimination alleged in deciding when to offer insulation to a church. Contrast these two situations: a religious teacher complains about sex discrimination because she had a baby out of wedlock, contrary to church teachings. A church organist is told he is too old to do the job anymore. In the first case, it makes sense for the court to stay out of the way. In the second case, it makes less sense to link age discrimination with a church’s right to determine its own doctrine.
This case will not be decided before the Court breaks in June for summer hiatus.
Posted by marykeating on May 11, 2010 under Religious discrimination, retaliation |
Chief Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm issued an opinion recently that dives into the murky waters of anti-discrimination laws and religious institutions. Under current law, religious institutions have some immunity from discrimination on the grounds of religious beliefs. They can insist upon employing “individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” That is, a synagogue can refuse to hire a Baptist as its administrative assistant; it can fire an employee for a religious observance that conflicts with a work schedule.
But Judge Grimm drew the line at religious harassment. Lori Kennedy, a member of the Church of the Brethren, complained of being harassed and eventually terminated because she adhered to a certain dress code dictated by her religion. Having decided to hire a non-Catholic at a Catholic hospital, the institution was not permitted to harass an employee whose modest dress and head covering were called inappropriate in a Catholic institution. The court decided that the harassment is not permitted under Title VII, the federal anti-discrimination statute. 
An interesting twist involves the plaintiff’s claims for illegal termination. Her claim of religious harassment will go to trial. She also complained that she was fired in retaliation for complaining about the harassment, and in violation of her right to be free of religious discrimination. The latter claim fails. The Catholic church is free to fire her for her religious beliefs. But the retaliation claim survives, since it arises out of the harassment. Her damages are the same for either claim.
